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Abstract 
The overall question addressed in this paper is, ‘What kind of philosophy of 
education is relevant to educational policy makers?’ The paper focuses on the 
following four themes: The meanings attached to the term philosophy (of 
education) by philosophers themselves. The meanings attached to the term 
philosophy (of education) by policy makers. The difference place and time 
makes to these meanings. How these different meanings affect the possibility 
of philosophy (of education) influencing policy. The question is addressed 
using philosophical methods and empirical evidence from conversations and 
conversational interviews with some philosophers of education and other 
educational researchers. The argument begins with an investigation of 
different ways of understanding philosophy and philosophy of education in 
relation to education and educational policy. It then examines first the current 
policy context and secondly some evidence about the practices of policy 
makers in relation to ideas and to research. It goes on to present some of the 
findings from the conversational evidence. The paper is drawn together in the 
penultimate section where I make some suggestions about possible fruitful 
relationships between doing philosophy and policy making. Finally, in the 
concluding section, some further – thorny – questions are raised by the 
analysis, especially in relationship to ethics and social justice. 
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I 
Introduction: Questions and themes in the paper 
 
Philosophers of education rightly want to influence educational policy makers 
(among others).  But are they doing so? And, if so, how? The overall question 
addressed in the paper considers what kind of ‘philosophy of education’ is 
relevant to educational policy makers.  The question arose after reflection on 
failures of communication during an attempt (by myself and my colleague, 
Gale Macleod) to find policy makers who were knowledgeable about, or 
interested in, philosophy and philosophy of education. I have now identified 
four central themes for exploration:  
1. The meanings attached to the terms ‘philosophy’ and ‘philosophy of 
education’ by philosophers themselves.  
2. The meanings attached to the terms ‘philosophy’ and ‘philosophy of 
education’ by policy makers and educators in other disciplines. 
Especially in the UK, but mindful both of the rest of Europe.  
3. The difference place and time may make to these meanings, especially 
across Europe, and particularly in relation to changes in funding 
policies for Higher Education.  
4. How these different meanings affect the possibility of philosophy and 
philosophy of education influencing policy. 
I sketch the contours of this exploration but a thorough mapping would be far 
beyond the scope of a single paper.  
 
II   
Context, summary and method. 
 
I was invited to investigate the question of the influence of philosophy of 
education on policy at the 2009 British Educational Research Association 
Conference as part of a plenary panel, ‘The voice(s) of philosophy in the 
conversation of the educational community’. For that presentation, and during 
this project (and an earlier, allied one) I worked closely with my colleague, 
Gale Macleod, and this paper draws extensively on our earlier work (Griffiths 
& Macleod 2008; 2009). 
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When we began the investigation we had expected it to be largely empirical. 
To our surprise, our enquiry turned out to be largely philosophical in 
character. We had begun by trying to identify key informants among 
educational philosophers and in policy circles who would be willing to be 
interviewed. However, we immediately ran up against a number of problems 
related to the variety of meanings attached to the term ‘philosophy’ by policy 
makers, philosophers of education and educational researchers from other 
disciplines. We noticed h ow the term ‘philosophy’ in ordinary English usage 
has very different meanings from the more technical ones preferred in 
academia. So we were forced to address the non-empirical question: When 
we look for evidence of the influence of ‘philosophy’ in policy making what are 
we looking for?  
 
This question is difficult enough. But there are further complications when 
considering education. Philosophers and philosophies of the last 2000 years 
remain influential and many well-known philosophers have regarded 
education as a significant issue in their work. Moreover, the question of how 
to have a philosophically-informed policy is necessarily a contingent one and 
so partly empirical: what is possible for us, here and now, is not the same as 
was possible for, for example, Plato, Rousseau or Dewey. Place and culture 
must affect how policy might become philosophically informed. At the same 
time, the concepts of ‘place’ and ‘culture’ themselves require philosophical 
analysis if they are to be investigated empirically.   
 
The next section, Section III, is an investigation of different ways of 
understanding philosophy and philosophy of education in relation to 
education, particularly educational policy. Section IV summarises some social 
science research evidence about the actual practices of policy makers in 
relation to research findings and scholarship – as distinct from the beliefs 
about it, held by either education researchers or policy makers. Section V 
presents some evidence using conversational interviews with philosophers of 
education and other educators. Section VI, concludes with suggestions about 
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relationships between philosophy and policy making. A coda in Section VII 
points out some remaining thorny issues of ethics and social justice. 
 
III   
Philosophy and philosophy of education in relation to education 
 
This section addresses the character of philosophy itself, as understood by 
philosophers and by non-philosophers. I have divided this complex topic into 
three sub-sections: Non-specialist views of what philosophy is and of its 
relation to education; what philosophers take philosophy to be; and 
philosophy of education in relation to educational practice and policy. 
 
Non-specialist views of what philosophy is and of its relation to education 
The question of what counts as ‘philosophy’ is contentious. ‘What is 
philosophy?’ is itself a philosophical question. There are some well-known 
answers. Whitehead’s comment is famous (Whitehead 1979, p.39): 
The safest general characterization of the European philosophical 
tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato,  
Indeed, Plato’s comment in the Theaetetus on the nature of philosophy is 
itself often quoted:  
The feeling of wonder is the mark of the philosopher; philosophy has 
no other beginning than this.  
This was not a view of philosophy that we have found well represented among 
non-philosophers however. Nor was another often quoted remark (attributed 
to various philosophers) that philosophy is what is found on the bookshelf in a 
philosopher’s study.  
 
At the start of the investigation we had asked policy makers, and educational 
researchers who worked closely with them, if they could help by putting us in 
touch with policy makers who had studied philosophy or who were interested 
in it. The plan failed. This was largely because we came up against a 
continued misapprehension about what we could mean. Some took us to be 
asking about ‘philosophy for children’. It quickly became apparent that there 
was a wide range of understandings about what it means to be influenced by, 
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or knowledgeable of, philosophy or philosophy of education. For some it 
meant a clear set of aims, values or principles (almost an ideology) as in ‘a 
collaborative philosophy views learning as inherently social’1 , and for others it 
seems to be about being reflective or thoughtful. Other meanings in general 
use are less approving. One group of established researchers thought of 
philosophy and philosophising as obfuscation, or attention to tiny, unimportant 
details. They went so far as to say to one person that she was a thinker rather 
than a philosopher, that being, for them, a more complimentary description2.  
 
These different meanings are familiar to anyone who teaches philosophy. A 
discussion on a philosophers’ listserv, PHILOS-L, focused on a blog 
(McKibben 2010) which used the word ‘philosophical’ several times. It was 
pointed out that the term was used in senses (PHILOS-L April 2010): 
that convey (or imply) ‘not at all concrete’, ‘not concretely practical or 
concerning’, ‘not important or immediate’, ‘somewhat unreal’, ‘entirely 
speculative or imaginative without end’, ‘merely theoretical’, and so 
forth. 
 
As we looked for evidence of the influence of philosophy of education, we 
found these misapprehensions of our meaning were a continual frustration for 
us. The frustration lasted for some months. We felt we were no further forward 
in our investigation. It is not that we – or indeed the contributors to PHILOS-L 
– felt that the common uses are wrong. As one typical post said (PHILOS-L 
April 2010):  
I don't at all think that we should be or feel ‘proprietary’ regarding the 
use of the term 'philosophical'.  As I hope most of us do, I think that the 
term should be freely and widely and helpfully used. 
It was pointed out that the various different meanings in common use have 
their counterparts in academic schools of philosophy, for instance medieval 
speculation (or theoria) on the one hand or various forms of ‘practical 
philosophy’ on the other.  
 
After some months we came to realise that, far from being an impediment, the 
question of the different meanings attached to ‘philosophy’ is centrally 
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relevant because it is has a bearing on the purpose of this exploration, namely 
to consider how philosophy of education can have a voice in educational 
policy. The answer must depend on how philosophers and other players in 
policy networks communicate what they are about. In short we cannot follow 
Deleuze and Guattari in the luxury of only asking the question (1994, p.1): 
 in a moment of quiet restlessness, at midnight, when there is no longer 
anything to ask,  
Or to have a youth in which (1994, p.1):  
There was too much desire to do philosophy to wonder what it was, 
except as stylistic exercise [and to wait for old age as a time when] one 
can finally say, ‘what is it I have been doing all my life?’ 
For us, in educational philosophy, we have to have more understanding of 
what we are doing, at least insofar as we understand what we are doing as 
educational. We want to educate and to influence others. That is the nature of 
education. It is a worthwhile activity  (however much we may differ among 
ourselves about how it is worthwhile and what is worthwhile about it), and it is 
one which is meant to be influential on others (students, policy makers, 
colleagues, etc). There is an  ethical difference between doing educational 
research in a School of Education and doing research on education within 
another School of Social Science or Humanities (Griffiths 1998).  
 
What do philosophers take philosophy to be? 
Necessarily, I must be highly selective when presenting a range of 20 and 21st 
century philosophical views about what philosophy is and, where relevant, its 
relation to education. My choice of who to include is, then, personal but, I 
hope not eccentric. 
 
Different answers to the question, ‘What is philosophy?’ seem to reflect a 
number of tensions within the discipline. These tensions are by no means 
simply one-dimensional. They are better described as multidimensional. Two, 
three, four or more different tensions all need resolution in any particular 
approach. One of the most obvious tensions is between philosophy as 
process and as product. It is reflected in the following two quotations from 
university websites explaining their philosophy courses. The first, from the 
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Open University in the UK, emphasises the process. Philosophy is, first and 
foremost, the act of doing philosophy (Open University 2010): 
Philosophy is different from many other Arts subjects in that to study it 
you need to do it. To be an art historian, you needn't paint; to study 
poetry, you needn't be a poet; you can study music without playing an 
instrument. Yet to study philosophy you have to engage in 
philosophical argument (reasons or evidence leading to a conclusion). 
Not that you have to operate at the level of the great thinkers of the 
past; but when you study philosophy, you will be doing the same sort of 
thing as them. 
In contrast, Dartmouth College in the USA emphasises outcomes (Dartmouth 
College 2010): 
Philosophy's goal is nothing less than a systematic world view. Other 
fields study particular kinds of things. Philosophy asks how it all fits 
together. For example, if you want to learn about bodies, take a course 
in physics or biology. If you want to learn about minds, take a course in 
psychology. But if you want to learn about how minds are related to 
bodies, or how physics is related to psychology, then philosophy (of 
mind) is for you. 
  
Other dimensions occur because the resolution towards product or process is 
only one of many philosophical tensions. The resolution towards product is 
itself subject to further tensions. The product may be considered to be a 
matter of the true or the good. Or it may be considered to be a matter of 
creativity. Deleuze and Guattari’s answer to the question, ‘What is 
philosophy?’ is the creation or formation of concepts (Deleuze & Guattari 
1994). Concepts created by the great philosophers may survive for centuries. 
Similarly the resolution towards process is subject to further tensions. One of 
these is about what might count as a dialogue: for instance, questions arise 
about the role of imagery and about criteria for rational discussion. (For 
instance, see Le Doeuff (1989) and Lloyd (1984).) There are, of course, many 
other tensions and dimensions, such as those deriving from the role of the 
tradition from (at least) Socrates, and the relevance of political stance. 
However a full discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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Another significant tension for education is related to actions in and on the 
world. Is the system to be contemplated or applied? Is the process a 
contemplation or an engagement in the world? In either case, what is the role 
of the philosopher’s own actions that inform their philosophy? Simone Weil 
may be a good example of a philosopher who felt this tension acutely. She 
says (Quoted in Cameron 2003, p.250): 
The proper method of philosophy consists in clearly conceiving the 
insoluble problems in all their insolubility and then in simply 
contemplating them, fixedly and tirelessly, year after year, without any 
hope, patiently waiting (First and Last Notebooks).  
This from a woman who was known for her tireless activism, both in education 
and in labour politics, in which her philosophy and philosophising was an 
integral part.  
 
Philosophy of education in relation to educational practice and policy. 
I do philosophy (of education) myself. Evidently how I resolve all these 
tensions  must influence my interpretation of other philosophers. For myself, I 
take it that philosophy is best done in relation to specific contexts, preferably 
those with which I am engaged. Further, I understand it as taking place in a 
process of multiple conversations and dialogues.  So doing philosophy is less 
coming up with a series of outcomes and more a way of understanding, of 
being in the world, including being aware of a number of relevant distinctions 
that might be drawn when making sense of it and of the self as part of it. 
These distinctions may be found in plain propositional terms and also in 
imagery of various kinds. So with respect to the outcomes plane, I am towards 
the creativity end; with respect to the process plane, I am of the view that 
imagery has a place in rational argument.   
 
It is in this context that I want to highlight some challenges currently facing the 
discipline, especially in relation to educational policy. The call for papers for 
the European Education Philosophy Conference in Basel in October 2009 set 
out the concern: 
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Educational philosophy presently appears to stand insecurely within 
disciplines and discourses of education and scientific policy. It seems 
questionable what role philosophical analyses in education should take 
within the – at times, dramatically appearing – transformations of the 
educational systems in Europe. 
   
Tensions about where philosophy of education should be placed along the 
dimensions of process, product, engagement, truth and rationality remain 
unresolved. There is very little agreement about the nature of a philosophical 
analysis in education. Recent collections of papers within the English 
language tradition demonstrate a high level of diversity (Blake et al. 2003; 
Carr 2005; Curren 2006), as is remarked in all the introductory sections. For 
example (Carr 2005, p.2):  
Any claim that the chapters included in this Reader convey a 
universally accepted view of the discipline is unlikely to receive 
anything remotely resembling unanimous assent.  
Chambliss in his review of recent collections says (Chambliss 2009, p.250):  
There remains a distinct sense that philosophy of education is what 
those who write it and teach it say it is. No doubt future writers and 
teachers will construe it in even different ways, and thereby will 
continue to raise questions concerning its nature that will remain 
unsettled. 
 
There has been an increasing number of articles on the relationship between 
philosophy of education and educational policy recently, including (just from 
the UK) McLaughlin (2000), Fielding (2000), Bridges (2003a; b), Carr (2004), 
Bridges et al. (2009), Oancea and Bridges (2009). Many of them focus 
exclusively on why policy makers should take note of philosophy of education. 
Some of them refer more to the processes of philosophical discussion, others 
to specific outcomes. Only a small minority consider promising contexts of 
engagement. Terry McLaughlin points to the possible influence of the series 
of policy focused pamphlets produced by the Philosophy of Education Society 
in the UK. He also remarks on two examples of philosophers being members 
of policy-related groups in the 1990s. Bridges (2003b) describes being a 
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member of various research groups working closely with policy makers during 
the course of his career.  
 
IV 
Evidence about the practices of policy makers in relation to research 
 
In this section I summarise some research evidence about the practices of 
policy makers in relation to research, including theoretical research. It draws 
heavily on a recent, influential overview and critical discussion of the use of 
social science research evidence in policy and practice (Nutley et al. 2007).  It 
focuses on four areas, one of which is education, and it does not take a 
narrow view of ‘research’. One typology the authors find useful is a two-
dimensional matrix with axes of ‘concrete to conceptual’, and ‘substantive 
through elaborative to strategic’.  
 
Three features of policy making are identified which are particularly significant 
here. Firstly, contrary to the ‘two communities’ theory of links between policy 
and research, Nutley et al. approvingly outline more nuanced models, such as 
Lomas’s linkage and exchange model which focuses on not two groups but 
four (policy makers, managers, service professionals and researchers), and in 
which (Nutley et al. 2007, p.101): 
all of these groups are not seen as homogeneous but diverse ... 
researchers might comprise in-house employees, management 
consultants, stand-alone centres, applied research institutes and 
academics.  
Going beyond Lomas, Nutley (2009) remarks that there are many active 
players in policy networks including, as well as the ones Lomas mentions: 
think tanks and knowledge brokers; professional bodies; lobbyists and 
advocacy groups; audit, inspection and scrutiny regimes, and the media. She 
also points out (2009) that ‘policy makers’ include: politicians, civil servants, 
local government officers and political advisors.  
 
The apparent division between the so called ‘two communities’ is further 
blurred because as Cooper et al. (2009) point out, many individuals and 
institutions combine the roles of research, policy making and practice. Further, 
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researchers, academics and policy makers may move from one role to 
another in the course of a career, taking previous perceptions and 
understandings with them. A third of the papers in Lesley Saunders’s (2007a) 
collection, Using Evidence, are by people who have moved between 
universities and policy making bodies. Others are by  people who have 
changed roles among the four groups Lomas identifies.  
 
Secondly, policy making is ‘a sophisticated process that involves multiple 
steps ... within a wider policy context’ (Nutley et al. 2007, p.101). It takes 
place over a period of time, and there are many stages of policy formation and 
implementation. These may or may not be rational-linear, when viewed 
analytically. They are certainly not chronologically linear (Nutley et al. 2007; 
Sanderson 2009).  While the rational model portrays the process as clearly 
defined, involving known actors and defined policies, more often policies 
emerge piecemeal and accrete, becoming shaped by dialogue with many 
actors and through a process of implementation (Nutley 2009). The process 
seems to favour personal engagement rather than written publication at all 
stages.   
 
Thirdly, a range of kinds of knowledge are both usable and used. This finding 
runs contrary to a widely held view that only one kind of knowledge 
(information) is wanted, and that it is needed for implementation or, just 
possibly, for evaluation. Both Nutley et al. and Saunders affirm that ‘research’ 
or ‘evidence-base’ includes conceptual resources as well as empirically 
generated data. Indeed Nutley et al. say that it seems as if ‘research is mainly 
used by policy makers in indirect, conceptual ways’ (2007, p.36).  This 
situation might appear to be good news for philosophers, but it needs to be 
understood in context. Very little research of any kind is used directly, and 
ideas seem to be picked up from a range of sources, rather than from 
commissioned conceptual research (Percy-Smith et al. 2002; Saunders 
2007b).  
 
VI 
Interviews and conversations with philosophers of education  
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and other educators 
 
There is very little empirical evidence on how research is used in policy in any 
subject, let alone in philosophy of education (Boaz et al. 2009). So I took 
advantage of my attendance at two conferences in Spring 2009: Philosophy of 
Education of Great Britain (PESGB), and the Teaching and Learning 
Research Programme (TLRP)3 to hold conversational interviews with 
philosophers and other educators who were aiming to influence policy. The 
educators at the TLRP were all from the UK but at the PESGB conference I 
spoke to philosophers from the Netherlands and Malta as well as the UK. 
Over the following months there were further opportunities to speak to 
philosophers of education in the UK who were trying to influence policy, and 
to other educators from the UK and from Italy. At same time, Gale Macleod 
and I reflected on our own experiences. Conversations were recorded in 
written notes. In the case of the conversational interviews these were taken at 
the time. Chance encounters were recorded afterwards in a research journal 
during 2009-10. As already explained, we had failed to find any 
philosophically minded policy makers. However at the PESGB conference I 
attended a talk by the experienced educational policy maker, Tim Brighouse4. 
 
There were a number of different ways in which philosophers perceive 
themselves to exercise some influence in the current context. Firstly, many 
philosophers of education become involved with wider educational research 
intended to influence policy, especially through participation in research teams 
of various kinds. Most often, philosophers become part of research teams 
because of their specific expertise in some educational area. David Bridges’ 
(2003b) account of several forms of participation in research by himself (as a 
historian) and by John Elliott (as an action researcher) has already been 
mentioned. Richard Pring headed the six year Nuffield Review of 14-19 
education. I myself have both been involved in a number of research teams. 
 
How far research or other involvements of this kind bring change is more 
complex. There are strong perceptions that policy makers do not want to 
engage with complex ideas when making use of educational research: Carmel 
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Gallagher5 was advised ‘to keep it brief; keep it simple’. Or as Judy Sebba6 
put it, ‘Policy makers want hard evidence by 4 o’clock this afternoon in three 
bullet points’. But the situation is not as bleak as this might indicate. The 
Nuffield Review is clearly structured by Pring’s philosophical approach. 
Although it was rejected by the government, he notes: 
On the basis of [the Review], I’ve given evidence to three select 
committees.  And that’s incorporated into those reports from the select 
committee which is feeding into policy process. (Pring, conversational 
interview, December, 2010).   
Reflecting on my own influence on research teams, I notice that I drew on my 
philosophical work, for example on social justice or on partnership, to 
introduce new ways of seeing these ideas, and to problematise and clarify 
concepts such as ‘standards’ or ‘dissemination’. Similarly, Gallagher 
describes how funding an educational researcher to work in the Department 
of Education meant that over time dialogue towards an alignment over moral 
purposes could develop. Historian Gareth Parry7 found an equal resistance to, 
as he put it, injecting historical and comparative findings (a ‘policy memory’) 
by carrying out policy research. However he found that as a result of carrying 
out the research he had a number of invitations to carry out projects or be a 
member of seminars in which he felt he had far more purchase on the policy 
process through continuing dialogue, conversation and insinuation of an 
historical/comparative perspective.  
 
Secondly, it is possible to become one of the policy makers. Tim Brighouse 
commented in his presentation that academics are seen by policy makers as 
‘hostile witnesses’. He suggested that it would be better to have philosophers 
as visitors and/or as ‘in residence’. Kenneth Wain in Malta described his 
experience of being a philosopher of education as part of an influential and 
powerful policy making team. He describes the experience as conflicted 
because of the competing demands of critique and construct.  
When you are on the inside you can’t go public with your critique. It’s 
always within four walls. Once decisions are taken and they’re taken by 
the minister, and even when you disagree a lot, you have to shut up. 
(Wain, conversational interview, April 2009) 
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However he said he had few regrets, in spite of the difficulties, because it 
allowed him to influence policy, as an educator and as a philosopher. 
My final evaluation? It was worth being in the policy. I don’t want to be 
entirely negative. I got some things done, even though I did not get my 
way all the time.  (Wain, conversational interview, April 2009) 
 
A third way of exercising influence was described vividly by both Kenneth 
Wain and by Bas Levering in the Netherlands.  
Why shouldn’t I stay on the outside and lambast them in the media? – 
Which works. A few months ago at a business breakfast with the 
Press, there was a presentation about the state of State schools. The 
prime minister said, ‘Any comments?’ I took the mike and lambasted 
him. Next thing it was on the News. What I said was in editorials. And it 
worked. It generated a whole charabanc. I was invited on the most 
popular programme, with a panel of experts, and the public. There was 
a programme dedicated to the issue. The Education Division and the 
Minister were there. It becomes more effective. People are talking 
about it. (Wain, conversational interview, April 2009) 
Similarly Bas Levering: 
I am doing a lot in the media. Next Monday I am on a news network. At 
6.15 p.m. they have an educational subject. They phone me... I speak 
three sentences or I explain and they edit it nicely....Yes, I think I have 
an influence on policy. They have to react to me. When they interview 
the minister, he knows they’ll interview me.  (Levering, conversational 
interview, April 2009) 
As a result, he is often asked to advise on government policy. 
 
VI 
Conclusion: The relevance of philosophy of education   
in educational policy making 
In this section I identify some ways in which philosophy of education and 
educational policy making can connect. To do so I summarise what has been 
said so far, first about ways of doing philosophy of education, and secondly 
about practices of policy making. I argued that the diverse practices of 
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philosophy can be understood as a series of resolutions to tensions inherent 
in the subject. There are at least four dimensions along which individual 
philosophers (and philosophies) can be placed in relation to these tensions. 
One of these dimensions is loaded for philosophers of education: 
contemplation or engagement with the world. Philosophers of education are 
all engaged with the world of education. They do not intend only to describe it 
but to influence it in some way. This may be through teaching, through 
contributing to the ideas circulating in a culture (e.g. in the media) and through 
direct engagement with other educators. The next most significant tension is 
process or product. This is a model in many dimensions. Process is itself two 
dimensional (at least): plain, strict logic or allusive, using imagery; as is 
product which may be the right and true or a new concept.  
 
In reviewing research about the practices of policy makers in relation to 
researchers, including philosophers, I noted that the terms ‘policy makers’ and 
‘researchers’ are ambiguous and misleading because they imply that these 
are homogeneous, bounded groups of people (the ‘two communities’ theory). 
Research indicates that both groups are diverse, overlapping with one 
another and with other active players in policy networks. Individuals move 
between and among these different social spaces in the course of their 
careers e.g. moving backwards and forwards from universities to government 
institutions. The process of making a policy happens over time, in a chain of 
steps, but only occasionally in a series of explicit decisions in a process of 
conscious deliberation. More often it is an on-going, chancy, piecemeal 
process, shaped by implementation and often accurately describable as 
‘muddling through’.  This process draws on a range of kinds of knowledge, 
including both the more conceptual and the more empirical.  
 
It is now possible to see some ways which the philosophy of education can be 
of relevance to policy makers. If the ‘two communities’ theory was more 
accurate it would be more difficult. But, as were Greenham women, 
philosophers of education are everywhere (Seller 1985)8.  We embody our 
discipline, its processes and its products, and we embrace our complex 
identities as, at the very least, philosophers and educators. We are found in 
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research teams, inside institutions of policy makers, working for and in the 
media, and we also teach people who will be influential as policy makers, 
journalists, editors or teachers. All of these groups are influential in policy 
networks. Moreover we can be active during all the steps of policy making. 
We may take part in dialogues as trusted colleagues or, in the honourable 
Socratic tradition, as gadflies. Or we can combine those roles. Finally, our 
different practices of philosophy of education provide different forms of 
knowledge with which to infuse, inject or impact on policy making.  
 
The conversational interviews with Ken Wain and Bas Levering accounts 
show how it is possible to intend influence and to use it in a variety of ways. 
Wain described how he has worked both as an insider and as an outsider to 
policy making institutions, sometimes in tune with the dialogue and sometimes 
as a gadfly. Levering similarly takes on both roles, as a gadfly from the 
outside using the media, and as an advisor engaging in dialogue as an inside.  
In a recent review of Arts and Humanities in Cambridge University Levitt et al. 
(2010) comment that philosophical influences on policy tend to be contingent, 
accidental: more about old colleagues going in different directions, and about 
chance meetings or encounters than about ‘knowledge transfer’ or 
dissemination strategies. The authors suggest putting oneself into a position 
to find chance encounters, something that Wain and Levering have both 
done.  
 
In conclusion, I began this paper by posing the question, ‘What kind of 
philosophy of education is relevant to educational policy makers?’.  Now, at 
the end of the paper it can be seen that the question is not well formed. The 
short answer is that every kind of philosophy of education is relevant to 
educational policy makers. But the significant question is, ‘What kind of 
philosophers of education are relevant in educational policy making? The 
short answer to this is, ‘Those who by good luck or good management 
engage with policy makers in some form of extended dialogue.’ 
 
With regard to its influence on policy, philosophy of education is best 
understood as embodied in philosophers of education who have developed a 
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philosophical sensibility and approach which is particularly oriented to 
educational issues, dilemmas and problems. That is, philosophy of education 
is influential insofar as philosophers of education are influential whether or not 
they present themselves as philosophers.  
 
VII  
Yes but... Some thorny issues 
 
The last section ended with what might be taken to be an optimistic 
conclusion. However it raises critical issues of ethics and social justice. A full 
discussion would need another paper but in the final section, I outline two of 
the most pressing ones.  
 
One pressing and thorny issue is ethical and also requires immediate practical 
action. This is a question of integrity. In order to stay alive in universities, 
philosophy of education needs to be funded by government. However 
European HE policy may mean that staying alive is incommensurate with 
leading a philosophical life. The HE policy agenda in Europe is driven by what 
European Commission calls the ‘modernisation of universities’ which they see 
‘as a core condition for the success of the Lisbon strategy’ and also ‘as part of 
the wider move towards an increasingly global and knowledge-based 
economy’ (Commission of the European Communities 2006, p.2). In my own 
context, the UK, the government has imposed a strong ‘impact’ agenda on all 
university research, including both philosophy and education. It is proposed 
that future funding for research will depend on being able to demonstrate 
case-study evidence of impact other than through teaching or publication 
(Higher Education Funding Council for England 2009). The ethical question 
depends on what kinds of ‘impact’ count. For instance, will critique in the 
media be allowable? How can complex embodiment be taken into account? 
How will a slow infusion of influence be demonstrated (measured?) in the 
short time-span demanded? Of course different ethical issues will arise 
depending on how countries develop their policies in response to pressures of 
the global knowledge economy. Marginson (Marginson 2008; 2009) 
interestingly points out that there are a number of different strategies that 
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nation states and world regions can adopt, and that previous predictions 
about futures in this regard have not proved accurate. So the ethical 
dilemmas that will be faced by e.g. Chinese or Indian philosophers of 
education in relation to educational HE policy are likely to be different from the 
ones that pertain in e.g. Europe or the USA.  
 
A second issue is seldom debated by philosophers of education. How far is it 
desirable for philosophers of education to influence policy? This is an issue of 
social justice. It turns on the socialities required for philosophical influence, 
given the gendered, classed, racialised character of any social space, and 
particularly those where power and influence are concentrated. As Jean Barr 
(2008) comments, the sociology of philosophy remains significant in gender 
terms. Drawing on arguments by Randall Collins and Michele Le Doeuff, she 
argues that the likelihood of knowledge being taken seriously is highly 
dependent on attitudes to gender. This will be as significant both for 
philosophers who act as trusted colleagues and also for Socratic gadflies. We 
may note that Socrates was taken seriously, while the criticism of Thales by ‘a 
maidservant from Thrace’ was not (Cavarero 1995). Similarly, surely, for class 
and race. Thus privilege will guarantee undue influence. The forms of 
reasoning, the imagery, the concepts of the right and the good, and creative 
conceptualisations will therefore be a particular, biased subset of possible 
philosophies of education.  
 
Finally, there is ethical question which faces the author of this paper, as it 
does any philosopher of education, that is, a philosopher whose purposes are 
educational. This question is how to live a philosophical life in the fast 
changing world of educational practice and policy.  
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Notes 
                                            
1
 This quotation is used only to point to one meaning in use. It is taken from: Taylor, M., 
Evans, K., Abasi, A. (2006). Towards a teaching and learning model in adult literacy 
programs. In Proceedings of the 25th Annual Conference of the Canadian Association for the 
Study of Adult Education (pp. 263 268). Toronto.  
2
 Personal communication,  from an anonymised source.  
3
 The TLRP was a £30 million coordinated research initiative (2000-2011). Its aim was to 
support and develop research which leads to improvements in outcomes for learners of all 
ages and in all sectors of education, training and lifelong learning in the UK. 
4
 Chief Education Officer for over ten years in Oxfordshire, five years in Birmingham and then 
Commissioner for London Schools for five years. 
5
 Carmel Gallagher, then Manager for Curriculum Development, Council for the Curriculum 
Examinations and Assessment (CCEA), in Northern Ireland 
6
 Professor of education at Sussex, who worked for years within governmental policy units. 
7
 Professor of history at Sheffield. 
8
 The slogan, ‘Greenham women are everywhere’ refers to the women’s peace camp at 
Greenham Common, part of wide network of women activists that was difficult to police. A 
contemporary account by a philosopher includes the following anecdote: “The Queen 
regularly holds garden parties each summer. An invitation is a reward for contributions to the 
establishment. At a recent one, guests found themselves holding calling cards that said, 
"Greenham Women are everywhere." (Seller 1985) 
